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AN EXAMINATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWERS
UNDER §5 OF THE 14th AMENDMENT
Gene R. Nichol, Jr.*
I. Introduction
The enforcement clause of the 14th amendment reads as follows: "Sec. 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the pro-
visions of this article." The determination of how far Congress may proceed
under the guise of "appropriate legislation" is, however, no simple matter. More-
over, the decisions of the Supreme Court regarding the scope of congressional
power under §5 of the 14th amendment have failed to remedy the confused
situation. The purpose of this article is to investigate the power given to Congress
through the Civil War Amendments and to prescribe a workable manner of
judicial review of such congressional activities.
II. Enforcement Powers under the 15th and 13th Amendments
As of this date, the scope of congressional power under the enforcement
clauses of the 13th' and 15th2 amendments appears to be well settled.
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court upheld several pro-
visions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act as being valid exercises by Congress of its
enforcement powers under §2 of the 15th amendment. There the Court made
it clear that under §2, "[i]t is the power of Congress which has been enlarged."'
Moreover, the test to be applied in a case involving §2 was held to be the same
as that applied in all cases concerning the express powers of Congress with rela-
tion to the reserved powers of the states; that is, Chief Justice Marshall's test
formulated in McCulloch v. Maryland:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution,
and all means are appropriate which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution,
are constitutional. 5
* Associate, Ely, Guess & Rudd, Anchorage, Alaska; J.D., University of Texas, 1976;
B.A., Oklahoma State University, 1973.
1 The 13th amendment reads as follows:
See. 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude except as punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Sec. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legis-
lation.
2. The 15th amendment reads as follows:
Sec. 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or pre-
vious condition of servitude.
Sec. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
3 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
4 Id. at 326.
5 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
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This result was further solidified when in Oregon v. Mitchell,6 the unanimous
Court applied the same test to hold the congressional banning of literacy tests
to be appropriate legislation under §2 of the 15th amendment.
The scope of the enforcement clause of the 13th amendment was inter-
preted similarly in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company.7 The Court held in
Jones that not only does the 13th amendment apply to private as well as state
discriminations, but that the proper inquiry when considering legislation enacted
under §2 of the 13th amendment is the same "legitimate ends . . . plainly
adapted means" test previously held to apply to §2 of the 15th amendment.8
The thrust of these two decisions remains intact, thus enabling Congress to
determine the scope of its power under the 13th and 15th amendments. Unfor-
tunately, §5 of the 14th amendment has not received similar judicial construction.
III. Judicial Interpretation of §5 of the 14th Amendment
A. Katzenbach and Guest Decisions
Initially it appeared that §5 of the 14th amendment would follow the
course carved out by the Court for her sister amendments. In Katzenbach v.
Morgan9 the Court upheld §4(e) of the 1965 Voting Rights Act which secured
the right to vote for any person who had completed the sixth grade in an
American flag school, even if he might be unable to pass a required state literacy
test. The provision effectively prohibited the application of the New York
literacy test with regard to a large bloc of the Puerto Rican minority in that
state. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, applied the McCulloch v. Mary-
land test to determine the validity of §4(e) under §5 of the 14th amendment.
The Morgan decision was even more far-reaching in that the Court was
willing to "perceive a basis" for the congressional enactment on two alternative
grounds. First, Congress could validly have enacted §4(e) as a "plainly
adapted" means of enhancing the political power of the Puerto Rican minority
in New York, to ensure that their right to equal protection of the laws was
maintained."0 Alternatively, however, Congress could have properly judged the
New York literacy requirement to be an invidious discrimination against the
Puerto Rican minority." The different approaches are important because
though arguably the first ground could be seen as a remedial provision, and
therefore read narrowly, the second ground clearly indicates that Congress has
the power under §5 not only to enforce the provisions of the 14th amendment, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, but to determine for itself the substantive
content of § 1 of that amendment. Congress may thus strike down state laws it
considers to be in violation of § 1. All this was done in light of the fact that the
Court itself had only recently held that literacy requirements were not in all
6 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
7 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
8 Id. at 443.
9 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
10 Id. at 652.
11 Id. at 654.
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circumstances prohibited by the 14th and 15th amendments.'2 The clear indi-
cation is that as long as the McCulloch test is not violated, Congress can reach
matters under §5 which the Court itself would not determine to be contrary
to the provisions of the 14th amendment.
It is noteworthy that Justice Harlan took a contrary view in his dissent to
Morgan (the dissent actually appeared in the companion case Cardona v.
Power)." Justice Harlan argued that although determinations by Congress of
factual issues in the equal protection and due process areas were to be given
deference by the Court, the determination of what actually violates the 14th
amendment is solely within the province of the judiciary. Therefore, after the
Supreme Court's rejection of the assertion that literacy tests were per se uncon-
stitutional, Congress was without power to adopt §4(e) of the 1965 Voting
Rights Act.14
In United States v. Guest six members of the Court were willing to reject
the long-standing doctrine of the Civil Rights Cases'6 which had held that
"appropriate legislation" under §5 could be used to remedy only invidious state
action. In Guest, six justices took the position that 18 U.S.C. §241,'l a federal
conspiracy statute, could properly reach under §5 even private conspiracies to
deprive citizens of ".... any right or privilege secured... by the Constitution
or laws of the United States." It was emphasized that "there now can be no
doubt that the specific language of §5 empowers the Congress to enact laws
punishing all conspiracies-with or without state action-that interfere with
Fourteenth Amendment Rights."' 8 Thus, reading Morgan and Guest together, it
would appear that with appropriate legislation Congress could not only reach
substantive equal protection and due process violations which the Supreme Court
would not invalidate; but when seeking to prohibit 14th amendment violations,
Congress may reach private as well as state activities. However, the decision
rendered in Oregon v. Mitchell9 sends the scope of §5 powers back into the
depths of uncertainty.
B. Mitchell Decision
In Oregon v. Mitchell, with five separate opinions running well over 100
pages, the Court considered the propriety of several provisions of the Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1970. As previously indicated, the Court unani-
mously held the Voting Act provisions banning the use of state literacy tests to
12 See Lassiter v. Northampton Elections Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
13 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 665 '(Harlan, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 667-670.
15 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
16 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
17 18 U.S.C. §241 (1970) reads in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, . . * They shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years or both.
18 383 U.S. at 762.
19 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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be proper under §2 of the 15th amendment." The Court then was forced to
consider the amendments to the Voting Rights Act, which modified residency
requirements for federal elections, and lowered the voting age to 18 in state
and federal elections. These analyses included a consideration of the scope of
congressional power under §5, and revealed a great diversity of opinion in this
regard.
1. Modification of Residency Requirements for Federal Elections
The residency modification was ruled constitutional by an 8-1 majority
with only Justice Harlan in dissent. However, the rationales are so varied as
to add little insight into power under §5 of the 14th amendment. Justices
Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall, considered the modification "appro-
priate legislation" under §5 since it was designed to protect the fundamental
right to travel, using the same standards announced earlier in Morgan. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Blackmun agreed that this was proper
legislation to protect the right to travel but based their conclusion on the necessary
and proper clause-going out of their way to avoid the §5 issue. Lastly, Justice
Black upheld the residency provisions on what he perceived to be the general
supervisory powers of Congress over federal elections. Thus, although the resi-
dency provisions were upheld, a majority of the Court would not conclude that
such enactments were supportable by §5 of the 14th amendment.
2. Eighteen-year-old Vote in State and Federal Elections
In its consideration of the provisions lowering the voting age to 18 in both
state and federal elections, the Court muddied the water even further. Again
Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall considered the measures appro-
priate under §5, with regard to both state and federal elections, since Congress
had a rational basis to determine that the present state of the laws constituted
a deprivation of a fundamental right to those between the ages of 18 and 21.
Justice Harlan advanced a strong position, based on legislative history of
the 14th amendment, that its provisions apply only to civil, not political (e.g.
voting) rights; and therefore the age reduction could not be justified in either
the state or federal context.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Blackmun contended that
Morgan, "even if rightly decided," could not be read as allowing Congress to
determine "what situations fall within the ambit of the clause, and what state
interests are 'compelling.' "21 Thus, like Justice Harlan, they considered the age
provisions unconstitutional in toto.
Justice Black provided the curious twist which accounted for the final
holding that the 18-year-old provisions could be validly applied to federal elec-
tions, but not state contests. Justice Black considered the provisions viable for
20 Justice Douglas upheld the literacy test prohibition as a valid exercise of §5 of the
14th amendment-aimed at protecting the privilege and immunities of the citizens in question.
By joining in the majority opinion in Morgan, however, he indicated that the provisions would
have been valid under §2 of the 15th amendment as well.
21 400 U.S. at 296.
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federal elections because of Congress' supervisory powers over national elections.
Yet, with regard to the states, the provisions could pass constitutional muster
only if sustainable under §5 of the 14th amendment. Justice Black then an-
nounced a test of §5 power more restrictive than that proposed by the majority
in Morgan, yet broader than the position taken by Justice Harlan in the dissent
to that case. He essentially called for a weighing of the proximity of the law in
question to racial concerns (the driving force behind all three Civil War Amend-
ments) against the proposed intrusion upon states' rights. Since the 18-year-
old vote intruded upon the states' right to set voter qualifications, yet was not
closely tied to racism, Justice Black considered it to be unconstitutional.
Despite the confusion inherent in such a diverse set of judicial opinions, it
is clear at least that Mitchell marks a retreat from the broad pronouncements
of congressional power under §5 contained in Morgan. Moreover, the Congress
today would be unlikely to base pervasive legislation on its enforcement powers
under the 14th amendment because of the uncertainty of the Supreme Court's
approach. The remainder of this article will consider the factors and competing
interests which should be taken into account in determining a workable standard
for judicial review of congressional activity under §5.
IV. Considerations in Construing §5
A. Impact of Legislative History
Before turning to the specific factors which play an important role in the
determination of Congress' powers under §5, it is important to consider the
position advocated by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Mitchell. Justice Harlan
argues persuasively that the framers of the 14th amendment did not intend its
provisions to apply to voting rights. He presents extensive legislative history
which indicates that the 14th amendment did not include any intrusion upon
the states' power to control elections.22 Therefore, he concludes that §5 cannot
be seen to provide Congress with the power to overrule voter qualifications set
by the states.
Justice Harlan's position is subject to attack on several grounds. The posi-
tion can be contested, as was done by Justice Brennan in Mitchell," by offering
conflicting statements by the various framers of the amendment which indicate
that there is no clear-cut legislative policy. Also, it can be attacked by pointing
out the inconsistency of Justice Harlan's adherence to the Marbury v. Madison
assertion that it is "emphatically" the province of the judiciary to say what the
law is, while indicating that legislators who are long dead can dictate to the
judiciary the hidden meaning of their words as framed in the constitutional
amendment. In a recent law review article Professor Orloski stated:
In Justice Harlan's view, therefore, the fourteenth amendment provided
that no state shall deny any person the equal protection of the laws except
22 Id. at 152-200 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
23 Id. at 252-275.
[Vol. 52:175]
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in the instance of state laws setting voter qualifications for state and federal
elections where the states can establish as many discriminatory practices
as they see fit.24
These criticisms go to the merits of Justice Harlan's position. Yet Justices
Douglas, Brennan, White and Marshall also attacked the use of the legislative
history of the 14th amendment in general. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting
opinion, stated: "Hence the history of the Fourteenth Amendment tendered by
my Brother Harlan is irrelevant to the present problem." 5 This assertion presents
something of a dilemma when one considers the scope of congressional power
under §5, as well as the propriety of a multitude of Supreme Court decisions
employing the new equal protection doctrine. If the Court can disregard the
intent of the framers when interpreting the amendment, what limitations exist on
the power of the Court?
[T]he federal judiciary, which by express constitutional provision is
appointed for life, and therefore cannot be held responsible by the electorate,
has no inherent general authority to establish the norms for the rest of
society. It is limited to elaboration and application of the precepts ordained
in the Constitution by the political representatives of the people. When the
Court disregards the express intent and understanding of the Framers, it
has invaded the realm of the political process to which the amending power
has been committed, and it has violated the constitutional structure which
it is its highest duty to protect.28
If we are to accept Justice Harlan's position, however, and base our 14th amend-
ment determinations on the state of mind of the framers, the overruling of
Supreme Court decisions within the last two decades regarding sexual discrnmi-
nation, equal educational opportunities, rights of criminal defendants, etc. seems
a necessary result. Moreover, under Justice Harlan's analysis, a state could pre-
sumably deny black citizens the right to run for office since that, like voting, is
a political right, and the 15th amendment applies only to voting, not holding
public office. Therefore, we must base our interpretations on the wording of
the amendment. Through we should be cognizant of the possibility for abuse
when basing either legislative or judicial activity on an amendment as nebulous
as our 14th amendment:
We must ... conclude that its framers understood their Amendment to be
a broadly worded injunction capable of being interpreted by future gener-
ations in accordance with the vision and needs of those generations. We
would be remiss in our duty if, in an attempt to find certainty amidst un-
certainty, we were to misread the historical record and cease to interpret
the Amendment as this Court has always interpreted it.27
24 Orloski, Enforcement Clause of the Civil War Amendments: A Repository of Legis-
lative Power, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 493, 503 (1975).
25 400 U.S. at 140 (Douglas J., dissenting in part). See also id. at 278 (Brennan, White,
Marshall, J.J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
26 Id. at 203 (Harlan, J., concurring in part).
27 Id. at 278.
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B. Enforcement, Not Dilution, of 14th Amendment
A careful reading of the §5 cases indicates that at least one factor of the
test applied in Morgan survived the Mitchell decision with a majority of the
Court, that being the limitation on congressional power under §5 to "enforce-
ment" rather than "dilution" of 14th amendment rights. In a footnote to the
Morgan opinion, Justice Brennan stated for the majority:
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent..., §5 does not grant Congress
power to exercise discretion in the other direction and to enact "statutes so
as to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this Court." We
emphasize that Congress' power under §5 is limited to adopting measures
to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; §5 grants no power to re-
strict, abrogate or dilute these guarantees. Thus, for example, an enactment
authorizing the States to establish racially segregated systems of education
would not be-as required by §5-a measure "to enforce' the Equal Pro-
tection Clause since that clause of its own force prohibits such state laws.28
This "dilution prohibition" was preserved in Mitchell because Justices
Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall strictly adhered to the rationale of
Morgan, and Justice Black, in his enunciation of his compromise test, stated as
follows:
As broad as the Congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited.
Specifically, there are at least three limitations upon Congress' power to
enforce the guarantees of the Civil Rights Amendments . ..Third, Con-
gress may only "enforce" the provisions of the amendments and may do so
only by "appropriate legislation." Congress has no power under the enforce-
ment sections to undercut the amendment's guarantees of personal equality
and freedom from discrimination, see Katzenbach V. Morgan. ..2
Justice Harlan attacked this prohibition against the dilution of the 14th amend-
ment in his dissent in Cardona v. Power."0 He argued that it was inconsistent
with the majority's position that under §5 it is appropriate for Congress to define
the substantive scope of the 14th amendment:
I do not see why Congress should not be able as well to exercise its §5
"discretion" by enacting statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection
and due process decisions of this Court. In all such cases there is room
for reasonable men to differ as to whether or not a denial of equal protection
or due process has occurred and the final decision is one of judgment.,,
Harlan's analysis is persuasive. If indeed §5 increases the power of Congress and
not that of the Court, and if we are to review congressional activities under §5
to determine only if a basis can be perceived for such actions, is it not incon-
sistent to argue that Congress' "discretion" can be exercised in only one direc-
tion? In Morgan the Court effectively states that Congress has the power to inter-
28 384 U.S. at 651, n.10.
29 400 U.S. at 129.
30 384 U.S. at 665.
31 Id. at 668.
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pret the substantive provisions of the 14th amendment, yet such interpretations
will be honored only if they do not retreat from the protections already an-
nounced by the Court.
• The key to a proper analysis is found in the word "enforcement." In the
context of §5, the power of "enforcement" must be regarded as extending to
Congress the power to do what it considers necessary to promote the provisions
of §1. Therefore the Court in Morgan is not really saying, "We will yield to
Congress' discretion in interpreting the substance of the 14th amendment, but
only so long as Congress agrees with us." Rather, the very provision upheld in
Morgan (effective ban on literacy tests) was in contradiction to the previous
position taken by the Court on the constitutionality of such tests. "2 Section 5 is
a grant of power to Congress to act in the due process and equal protection
areas, but the power arises only when the activity in question can be determined
to be in furtherance of the overall policy of the amendment. Indeed, if the
rationale behind the enforcement clause was that Congress had greater expertise
in determining what is a due process or equal protection violation, the "incon-
sistency" described by Justice Harlan would be a true one. Yet the enforcement
clause enlarged the power of Congress in the realization that the scope of con-
gressional action is not limited to a particular case or controversy, as is the action
of courts. Instead, Congress can deal with problems, and fashion remedies, on a
nationwide basis.
In summary, any action taken by Congress in the area of due process or
equal protection is not necessarily "enforcement" of the amendment. If Congress
legislates under §5, the Court must first determine whether the provision is
indeed an "enforcement" of the amendment, i.e, whether it seeks to promote
the spirit of § 1. It is only after such a determination has been made that the
"discretion" spoken of in Morgan applies.
For example, on March 17, 1972, President Nixon sought to overrule the
numerous Court decisions ordering busing by making the following proposal:
The 14th Amendment to the Constitution ... provides that "The Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article."
Until now, enforcement has been left largely to the Courts-which have
operated within a limited range of available remedies. . .. I propose that
the Congress now accept the responsibility and use the authority given to
it under the 14th Amendment to clear up the confusion which contradictory
court orders have created...ss
If such a comprehensive scheme of remedies were to be forthcoming from the
Congress under §5, the initial determination for the reviewing Court would be
whether the enactment was indeed an enforcement of the 14th amendment or
a dilution of it. If the Court decided that the scheme did not promote the spirit
of the equal protection clause, it could not properly be characterized as an
"enforcement" under §5 and thus no power could be derived therefrom.
32 See Lassiter v. Northampton Elections Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
33 118 Cong. Rec. 8929 (1972).
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C. State Action Requirement?
As previously stated, in United States v. Guest"4 six justices took the position
that Congress could reach private conspiracies to deprive persons of constitu-
tional rights under §5. It is important to note that this determination is only
dicta and is not the holding of the case. In Guest, the indictment alleging a
violation of 18 U.S.C. §241S5 was dismissed because the trial court held that there
was an insufficient allegation of state action. The Supreme Court reversed,
saying that the allegation of state action was indeed sufficient, and specifically
reserved the question of whether or not a state action requirement must be read
into 18 U.S.C. §241.36 Justices Black, Clark and Fortas joined in the opinion
of the Court but stated that the majority opinion could possibly be read sub
silentio as a statement that Congress does not have power under §5 to reach
private conspiracies. Therefore, the concurring Justices stated:
Although the Court specifically rejects any such connotation . ..it is, I
believe, both appropriate and necessary under the circumstances here to
say that there now can be no doubt that the specific language of §5 em-
powers the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or with-
out state action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights.37
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Brennan felt the sub silentio
aspects of the case to be so strong that they dissented in part stating:
I believe that §241 reaches such a private conspiracy, not because the Four-
teenth Amendment of its own force prohibits such a conspiracy, but be-
cause §241, as an exercise of congressional power under §5 of that Amend-
ment, prohibits all conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of a "right...
secured... by the Constitution"...
Justice Brennan made it clear that six members of the Court in Guest read §5
as allowing Congress to enact such laws as it considers "reasonably necessary
to protect a right created by . . . that Amendment. . ."" -thus specifically
rejecting the interpretation of §5 offered in the Civil Rights Cases.4" Therefore,
although there has been no specific holding on the issue of whether state action
is required in the exercise of §5, the very strong sentiment of United States v.
Guest is that Congress, when seeking to protect a right insured by the 14th
amendment, may reach private as well as state action.
The wisdom of this position, however, is doubtful. The 14th amendment
states in relevant part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty or property.
34 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
35 18 U.S.C. §241 (1970).
36 383 U.S. at 755.
37 Id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring).
38 Id. at 777 (Justice Brennan's emphasis).
39 Id. at 782.
40 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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Sec. 5. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article. (Emphasis added).
To state that Congress may "enforce" the provisions of the 14th amendment by
appropriate legislation without regard to the key requisite of the amendment
itself, i.e., state action, is to ignore the language and distort the meaning of the
amendment.
Assume for discussion that a constitutional amendment is adopted, similar
to the Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibited "all combinations, contracts
and conspiracies which have a detrimental effect on free competition." Assume
further that such an amendment has an enforcement provision identical to §5.
Would it not be strange to say that, while enforcing this hypothetical amend-
ment, Congress could reach any activity "detrimental to free competition"
regardless of whether it amounted to a "contract, combination or conspiracy"?
Clearly any activity "detrimental to free competition" would not be prohibited
by such an amendment. Analogously, any deprivation of constitutional rights is
not prohibited by the 14th amendment. Instead, only those deprivations sanc-
tioned by the states are prohibited. There is no support in the 14th amendment
for the reaching of private activity unless we are willing to cast aside the wording
of the amendment and read into it what we desire. If such is the case, why bother
with the amendment at all, why not be more honest and say we can reach
private conspiracies because it sounds like a good idea? Certainly, Congress is
not "enforcing" the 14th amendment when it reaches admittedly private con-
spiracies which do not even arguably come within the purview of that amend-
ment.
Thus the state action requirement of the 14th amendment must be met
even when Congress execises its "enlarged" powers under § 5. This does not
mean, however, that it would be impossible for Congress to reach activities which
the Court has found do not constitute state action. If the courts are able to find
the requirement satisfied in situations where something less than affirmative and
overt state involvement is present, it seems clear that Congress can go at least as
far under § 5. Further, once a reviewing court determines that the activity in
question is an enforcement, rather than a dilution, of the amendment, the same
"rational basis" review used in Morgan4 should be applied. Thus, if the court
could perceive a rational basis for the congressional position that the activity
sought to be regulated constitutes state action-the requirement would be met.
Under this test, legislation in areas involving "borderline" state action, e.g.,
public utilities, public foundations, private schools, self-help repossession under
the U.C.C., etc., could be properly enacted by the Congress under § 5. Yet,
unlike an interpretation allowing purely private actions to be reached under § 5,
the wording of the amendment would retain its vitality. Private conspiracies to
deprive citizens of constitutional rights, like those prohibited in 18 U.S.C. § 241,
however, are more properly reached by Congress under § 2 of the 13th amend-
ment.
41 384 U.S. at 653.
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V. The Search for an Appropriate Standard of Review
The difficulty in determining a proper standard of review for congressional
actions under § 5 is compounded greatly by the broad terms employed in the
14th amendment itself. As previously discussed, it is well settled that the "neces-
sary and proper" standard will be applied to congressional enactments under the
enforcement clauses of both the 13th and 15th amendments. However, since the
substantive provisions of those amendments are tied closely to race, this limited
type of review seems acceptable to a majority of the Court. The 14th amend-
ment, however, refers to deprivations of due process and equal protection of the
laws without specific limitation to the racial context. It is likely, for this reason,
that several members of the Court have been reluctant to give Congress the free
hand that such limited review entails.
A. Justice Harlan's Position
In his dissent in Cardona v. Power,42 Justice Harlan offered his position on
the proper scope of congressional power under § 5. He argues that Congress has
the power to proceed with appropriate legislation only after the "existence of the
evil" has been determined by the judiciary. He takes strong opposition to the
language in Morgan indicating that Congress may properly interpret the sub-
stantive content of the 14th amendment in order to determine that certain state
practices are in violation of its provisions. According to Justice Harlan, such
interpretations are questions "for the judicial branch ultimately to determine."
Therefore, after the Court held in Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board" that
literacy tests were not in all instances unconstitutional, his conclusion was that
Congress had no power to enact such a ban on literacy tests.
Seemingly, Justice Harlan would limit the enlargement of congressional
power under § 5 to a deference by the Court to Congress' legislative fact-finding
expertise. Admittedly, such a rationale greatly minimizes what the Court might
foresee as a danger of abuse by the legislative branch if Congress is allowed to
interpret the substantive provisions of the amendment. However, it likewise
minimizes the power which would seem to be inherent in an express provision
authorizing "appropriate legislation." Justice Harlan, in effect, gives no weight
to § 5 whatsoever. He states that congressional expertise should be given due
respect by the Court. But would not this be the case regardless of § 5? Moreover,
in Cardona v. Power he states that congressional findings should not be given
precedence over the findings of the state legislatures. Therefore, Justice Harlan's
interpretation effectively reads § 5 out of the Constitution. The requirement that
Congress act only upon judicially declared evils seems clearly inconsistent with
the notion that it is the legislative power that has been increased by § 5. Clearly
§ 1 of the 14th amendment is self-enforcing and, just as clearly, the inclusion of
§ 5's grant of legislative power was not meant to be duplication or empty lan-
guage. For this reason, Justice Harlan's interpretation of congressional power
under § 5 is unacceptable.
42 384 U.S. 672 (1966).
43 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
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B. The Morgan Test
The test applied by the majority in Morgan, and by four justices in Mitchell,
is the same broad standard used to review legislation under the necessary and
proper clause.44 That test, as formulated by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch,
requires that the ends be legitimate and within the scope of the Constitution, and
that the means be plainly adapted to those ends and consistent with the letter
and spirit of the Constitution.45
Such a test is consistent with the broadest reading of the grant of con-
gressional power under § 5. As previously stated, under it Congress is not limited
to remedial measures after the courts have declared state actions improper, but
may decide for itself which state activities are violative of the 14th amendment.
For the reasons discussed in the last section, any test consistent with the express
provision for "appropriate legislation" in § 5 must attribute to Congress the
power to interpret the substantive provisions of the 14th amendment. However,
in line with the following discussion, the broad test offered by the majority in
Morgan, though generally acceptable, should be significantly qualified when the
congressional activity in question intrudes upon the areas of power traditionally
exercised by the states.
The problem with the McCulloch test is that it seems almost without limits.
The scope of congressional power to legislate "appropriately" under the com-
merce clause alone would seem to be so pervasive as to include the regulation of
almost anything, as is demonstrated by Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States48
and Katzenbach v. McClung.47 Moreover, the potential range of the due process
and equal protection clauses would seem to be even greater than that of the com-
merce clause. Consider the following examples.
Suppose that Congress passed a national criminal justice administration pro-
cedure act. Under this hypothetical plan, Congress might attempt to regulate
every phase of the state judicial process. Uniform court systems would be im-
posed upon the states, from the justice of the peace court to the supreme court
level, including uniform rules of evidence and trial procedure. It seems arguable
that such a plan would be supportable under § 5 of the 14th amendment accord-
ing to the Morgan test. In light of the greatly divergent state procedures, some
of which offer greater protection of the rights of criminal defendants than others,
and a possible finding by Congress that these state systems have resulted in re-
peated deprivations of liberty without due process, such a plan might be con-
sidered a "plainly adapted means" of achieving a "legitimate" goal, i.e., ensuring
due process to criminal defendants.
Suppose that, as an attempted answer to the continual problems resulting
from confusing busing orders by federal courts, and continuing efforts by state
governments to impede the progress of integration, Congress announced that the
creation of a national public school system was an "appropriate" means of en-
forcing the equal protection clause.
44 384 U.S. at 651.
45 Id. at 650.
46 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
47 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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Hopefully, the point of these examples is clear. Conceivably, under the
Morgan test Congress could, by "enforcing" the due process and equal protection
clauses, effectively change our entire structure of government. Powers tradi-
tionally in the hands of the states could be assumed by the federal government as
long as the means in question are plainly adapted to a legitimate end consistent
with the Constitution. As Justice Black stated in Mitchell:
My Brother Brennan's opinion, if carried to its logical conclusion, would,
under the guise of ensuring equal protection, blot out all state power, leav-
ing the 50 States as little more than impotent figureheads. In interpreting
what the Fourteenth Amendment means, the Equal Protection Clause should
not be stretched to nullify the states' powers.. 48
C. Consideration of States Rights
The 14th amendment seeks to assure equal protection of the laws and to
prevent deprivations of life, liberty and property; yet it is not aimed at creating
an all-powerful federal government resulting in the elimination of state auton-
omy. For this reason, when determining the constitutional propriety of con-
gressional activity under § 5, one of the factors which should be considered is
the extent to which the proposed legislation intrudes upon exercises traditionally
left to the states. Justice Black sought to include such a factor in his opinion in
Mitchell. There he stated that, although Congress' power to "enforce" the 14th
amendment is broad, there are at least three specific limitations upon its exercise:
"Congress may not repeal other provisions of the Constitution, dilute the amend-
ment in question, or strip the states of their power to govern themselves and thus
create a central government of unrestrained authority.. . Y,19
He further suggested that the power of Congress under the Civil War
Amendments is greatest when it is used to remedy racial discrimination and only
then may it properly intrude upon areas reserved to the states. Thus, he con-
cluded that the provisions extending the vote to 18-year-olds in state elections
were unconstitutional:
Since Congress has attempted to invade an area preserved to the States by
the Constitution without a foundation for enforcing the Civil War Amend-
ments' ban on racial discrimination, I would hold that Congress has exceeded
its powers in attempting to lower the voting age in state and local elections.50
However, if the states' right in question is not one expressly reserved in the Con-
stitution, the enforcement powers need not be so closely tied to racism.
Justice Black's suggestion that the extent of intrusion upon states' rights be
considered in determining the constitutionality of congressional activity seems a
wise one. Only through such a weighing process can abuses of federal power be
avoided. However, for many of the same reasons that Justice Harlan's position,
that the legislative history of the 14th amendment prevents Congress from en-
48 400 U.S. at 126.
49 Id. at 128.
50 Id. at 130.
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forcing "political" rights, was unsatisfactory, so also may objection be made to
Justice Black's argument that Congress may exercise its full powers under the
14th amendment only when it legislates against racial discrimination.5 1
Justice Black was willing in Mitchell to severely limit congressional power
under § 5 when the remedy in question was not closely tied to race. However,
in the past few decades, the Supreme Court has been extremely unwilling to
limit its own power of review under the equal protection clause when the dis-
crimination in question was other than racial. The Court has specifically rejected
various discriminations based on alienage,52 nationality,53 wealth,54 sex 5 and
legitimacy of birth. 6 It seems late in the game to seek to limit congressional
power under the 14th amendment to racial discriminations, especially since it is
the "power of Congress which has been enlarged."57 Moreover, the Court
has repeatedly stated that:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of
a particular era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of equality,
any more than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what
was at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights ...
Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause do change.58
Section 5 of the 14th amendment contains no limitation to issues of racial dis-
crimination. Moreover, in light of the use made of the equal protection and due
process clauses by the Supreme Court over the past four decades, it is incongruous
that in 1977 Congress cannot act with equal vitality to erase discriminations
based on race, sex, alienage and nationality under § 5.
Therefore, although Justice Black's decision to weigh the intrusion upon
states' rights should be retained, his insistence that Congress may exercise its
full § 5 power only when seeking to remedy racial discrimination is inconsistent
with judicial interpretation of the 14th amendment. Instead, in determining
whether Congress has legitimately exercised its § 5 power, the Court should con-
sider the gravity of the deprivation or the arbitrary nature of the classification at
which the congressional activity is aimed. This should then be weighed against
the seriousness of the intrusion upon the powers traditionally exercised by the
states in our federal scheme.
Such a balancing process would serve the aims of the 14th amendment in
that it would allow Congress to take the initiative to prohibit discriminatory
activity and abuses of due process by the states. Yet, it would, when possible, seek
to preserve to the states those functions traditionally exercised by them. Under
this balancing test, only the most serious denials of due process, or classifications
of a clearly arbitrary nature, would merit intrusion upon those powers expressly
51 See text accompanying notes 42-43 infra.
52 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
53 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
54 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
55 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
56 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
57 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880).
58 Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
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reserved to the states in the Constitution. When a congressional enactment in-
trudes upon an area traditionally reserved to the states, the violation of the due
process or equal protection clause must be of a more serious nature than if a
traditional state activity were not involved. Such congressional intrusions may
be acceptable, when necessary, for the 14th amendment changed the entire Con-
stitution-including those provisions reserving power to the states. Moreover,
this balancing process would provide the Court with ample leeway in considering
the propriety of congressional activity under the "changing" concepts of the due
process and equal protection clauses.
This balancing of interests is consistent with the decision of the Court in
Mitchell. The modification of residency requirements for federal elections,
which was upheld in Mitchell, represented a limitation by the states on the funda-
mental right to travel. At the same time, state governments can be seen to have
little interest in maintaining longer residency requirements for voting in federal
elections.
The decision with regard to the 18-year-old vote, of course, reflects the
justices' differences of opinion concerning the magnitude of the deprivation to
18-year-olds and on the rationality of the classification. Most noteworthy, how-
ever, is the fact that the split outcome (upholding the provision with regard to
federal elections, but striking it down in the state context) may be seen to
turn on the relative importance of the states' interest in the matter.
Further, in the two hypothetical situations spoken of earlier,5" the states'
interest and traditional role in criminal justice administration and public educa-
tion would clearly outweigh all but the most flagrant abuses in those areas by the
states.
VI. Conclusion
When reviewing the constitutionality of congressional enactments under §
5, the court should first determine whether the law in question is properly char-
acterized as an enforcement or a dilution of § 1. Having determined the enact-
ment to be an enforcement, the Court should decide whether it can perceive a
basis for a finding by Congress that the evil sought to be remedied constitutes
state action. Thereafter, the legislation should be reviewed under the McCulloch
test, recognizing Congress' power to both remedy evils prohibited by the Supreme
Court and to interpret the substantive provisions of § 1 for itself. However, when
the activity in question threatens intrusion into powers traditionally held or
exercised by the states, the seriousness of the deprivation or the arbitrary character
of the classification must be weighed against the intrusion. Under such a balanc-
ing procedure, the twin aims of adequate enforcement of the 14th amendment
and preservation of powers traditionally exercised by the states would be better
served.
59 See text following note 47 infra.
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